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Flexible Fatherlands: "Patriotism" among Polish-speaking German Citizens during 
the First World War
In narratives of Polish history, the First World War has proven to be both 
indispensable and indigestible. It has been indispensable because it provides the run-
up to what is arguably the central event of the national drama: the “resurrection” of an 
independent Polish state. The war can thus be seen as providential, the “universal war 
for the freedom of the peoples” for which Poland’s national poet, Adam Mickiewicz, 
had prayed almost a century earlier.1 Histories of “Poland” or of “Poles” during the 
First World War have thus been predictably focused on those who could serve as 
convincing protagonists in this recovery of national independence, above all the 
members of the Polish Legion, led by Józef Pilsudski, who fought as part of avowedly 
Polish military units and under a Polish banner. It is, for example, the actions of such 
 A paper that formed the germ of this article was presented at a conference on 
“Patriotic Cultures during the First World War” in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 
2014. An article based on that paper was subsequently included in a Russian-language 
edited volume: "V poiskakh patriotizma sredi pol'skoyazychnykh germanskikh 
poddannykh, 1914–1918," in Kultury patriotizma v period Pervoy mirovoy voyny. 
Sankt-Peterburg, 2018.  This article is a substantially revised revised version of that 
contribution to the edited volume.
1 Adam Mickiewicz, “The Pilgrim’s Litany,” in Poems by Adam Mickiewicz, trans. 
Dorothea Prall Radin, ed. George Rapall Noyes (New York: Polish Institute of Arts & 
Sciences in America, 1944), 414-5. 
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soldiers—and only the actions of such soldiers—that are explicitly commemorated on 
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw.2
But alongside this indispensable narrative of the war as prelude to 
independence, there has been the indigestible story of what most Poles actually did 
during the war. Between 1914 and 1918, over three million men from the territory of 
interwar Poland—more than one hundred times the number who enlisted in the Polish 
Legions3—served in the regular armed forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or 
Russia.4  If the defining moment in the normative Polish wartime biography, modeled 
2 The military engagements inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier mostly 
involved the Polish Legions, who fought alongside Austro-Hungarian forces. But the 
list also includes some actions by Polish units that fought alongside Russian imperial 
forces in the early years of the war, as well as some engagements in 1918, following 
the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, involving Polish Corps organized from a 
mix of former Legionnaires and troops from the former Russian imperial army that 
fought against German forces.
3 The peak strength of the Polish Legions (at the beginning of 1917) was 21,000, with 
12,600 involved in actual fighting. An additional 18,000 soldiers were recruited to 
Polish units fighting alongside the Russian army. Julia Eichenberg, Kämpfen für 
Frieden und Fürsorge: Polnische Veteranen des Ersten Weltkriegs und ihre 
internationalen Kontakte, 1918-1939 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), 29-30.
4 Andrzej Gawryczeswki, Ludność Polski w XX wieku (Warsaw: Polska Akademia 
Nauk, 2005), 411. The total figure cited here—3,375,800—included 779,500 serving 
in the Germany army, 1,195,800 serving in the Russian army, and 1,401,500 serving 
in the Austro-Hungarian army. These numbers are based on the total population of the 
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on the career of Pilsudski, was a demonstrative refusal to swear direct allegiance to 
the partitioning powers, the wartime biographies of the overwhelming majority of 
military-age Polish men were defined by a willingness to do precisely that. Forms of 
support for the imperial war efforts among women and men not subject to 
conscription would have been more diffuse—e.g., contributions to economic 
production; subscription to war loans; acceptance of privation on the home front—but 
again far more ubiquitous than overt Polish-patriotic activity. How are we to make 
sense of this service to imperial powers during a war that ostensibly led to national 
liberation? Could it be explained by straightforward coercion, making it a matter of 
abject compliance rather than active loyalty? Alternately, was it an indirect and tragic, 
but nonetheless genuine, expression of devotion to the Polish national cause, an 
acceptance of a fratricidal division of labor aimed at laying the groundwork for 
eventual independence? Or did mass sacrifice for the German, Habsburg and Russian 
empires instead suggest that Polish national sentiment among the general population 
was weaker than often supposed?
In exploring this puzzle, my particular focus in this essay will be on what 
might seem its most puzzling single manifestation: support for the German war effort 
territory of Poland c. 1922.  They would therefore include a large proportion of 
inhabitants, especially in former Russian and Austro-Hungarian territory, who were 
not primarily Polish-speaking. They would also exclude a smaller number of Polish-
speakers from areas such as western Upper Silesia and Masuria that did not become 
part of interwar Poland. In ethnolinguistic terms, then, there may have been more 
Polish-speaking soldiers in the German army than in either of the other two imperial 
armies.
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by people who spoke Polish as a native language and showed at least some signs of 
sympathy for the Polish national cause. Germany, after all, was the imperial power 
that most closely resembled a nationalizing state. Unlike the Habsburg Monarchy, and 
much more effectively than the Russian Empire, Germany had sought the linguistic 
homogenization of its residents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
with transmission of Polish language and culture explicitly targeted for curtailment.5 
But although German victory was the outcome that may have seemed the least 
compatible with Polish national aspirations, it was, already by the autumn of 1915, 
the outcome that looked most likely to happen, at least in Eastern Europe. If Polish 
interests were to be accommodated at all after the war, it seemed that they would have 
to be accommodated within the framework of a German-dominated Mitteleuropa. 
Polish-speaking citizens of the German Empire played crucial mediating roles in this 
process, both in the form of high-profile publicists, who were given privileged access 
to the periodical market in the lands of occupied Russian Poland, and in the form of 
regular soldiers, who wore the uniform of the German army but spoke the language of 
the local population. Contemporaries as well as subsequent commentators struggled to 
assess both the ultimate loyalties of those playing these ambiguous roles and the 
impact of their actions. This essay will certainly not resolve all of these questions. But 
it will suggest some approaches for examining apparently mutually exclusive German 
and Polish loyalties as instead being—at least in some contexts—mutually 
5 For a recent account of Imperial Germany as a nationalizing empire, see Stefan 
Berger, “Building the Nation Among Visions of German Empire,” in Stefan Berger 
and Alexei Miller, eds., Nationalizing Empires (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2015), 247-308, especially 253-4 on Germanization.
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constitutive, depending on and informing one another rather than serving as 
alternative orientations.
The term “patriotism” will feature prominently in this analysis, so an 
explanation of my working definition is in order. The word is often deployed in a 
normative sense, denoting a good (tolerant, defensive) version of love of country, 
explicitly or implicitly contrasted with nationalism—the bad (bigoted, aggressive) 
version.6  My own use of patriotism and nationalism as analytical terms has a 
different aim, building on distinctions developed in recent scholarship on nationalism. 
Nationalism, reflecting Ernest Gellner’s well-known definition, refers to support for a 
nation-state, in which the political community (the state) and the cultural community 
(the nation) are made congruent.7 Patriotism refers more broadly to allegiance to any 
political community, whether or not it fits the model of a nation-state. This is a 
familiar distinction for historians of the Habsburg empire, who commonly refer to an 
"imperial" or "dynastic" state patriotism that co-existed in tension with linguistic 
6 Perhaps the most famous normative distinction between patriotism and nationalism 
was put forward by George Orwell in his essay “Notes on Nationalism” (1945). For 
Orwell, nationalism did not necessarily have anything to do with nations but simply 
denoted a “desire for power” on behalf of any group. Patriotism, in turn, was defined 
as any form of loyalty or identification that remained “defensive” and avoided such 
aggressive overreach. 
7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 1-7. 
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nationalisms.8 For historians of Czarist Russia, the distinction between imperial state 
patriotism and Russian nationalism is subtler, but the former has often been treated as 
an important and distinct phenomenon among non-Russian speakers.9  Imperial 
patriotism is also a widely used concept in scholarship on the British empire.10 One 
historian has used the concept of “empire loyalism” to compare the attachments of 
Scots to the British empire and Ukrainians to the Russian empire.11  
Among historians of Wilhelmine Germany, by contrast, this understanding of 
“imperial patriotism” has been largely absent. Recent discussions of Germany-as-
empire have instead focused on forms of racialist domination and exclusion that 
would seem to have precluded any form of participatory patriotism among non-
8 For example: Laurence Cole, Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late 
Imperial Austria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Daniel Unowsky, The 
Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-
1916 (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006).
9 In her recent book, Melissa Stockdale defines patriotism as “love of and loyalty to 
one’s patria—that is, traditional, state-based patriotism”. Mobilizing the Russian 
Nation: Patriotism and Citizenship in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 10. She devotes a section to the ways in which Polish-
speakers were “rehabilitated, honoured, and embraced” as essentially loyal Russian 
subjects/citizens during the war (170).
Page 6 of 48
Cambridge University Press
Central European History
For Peer Review
7
Germans.12 This focus is certainly understandable, given the later unfolding of Nazi 
racialist empire-building. But what it fails to do justice to, and what this article aims 
to illuminate, is the prevalence among both ordinary Polish-speaking German subjects 
and Polish-language publicists of a “Habsburg” approach to patriotism, one that 
sought to decouple loyalty to the state from identification with a cultural nationality. 
It was an approach that proved unsuccessful in the long-run and came to appear 
hopelessly naïve. But in the rapidly evolving context of the war, I argue, it 
represented a plausible bid by Polish-speakers to claim rights and exercise power as 
national and imperial projects, and the relationship between them, were being 
reimagined.
10  For a wide-ranging discussion of varieties of patriotism in the British context, see 
David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2012).  Monger examines identification with the broader 
British empire (especially the Dominions) alongside identification with other Allied 
powers (especially the United States and France) under the term “supranational 
patriotism” (92-3). 
11  Stephen Velychenko, “Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain 
and Imperial Russia, 1707-1914: Institutions, Law and Nationality in Scotland and 
Ukraine,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 39, no. 3 (July 1997), 413-441.
12  Edward Ross Dickinson offers a useful overview of recent debates about “empire” 
in German historiography in “The German Empire: An Empire?” History Workshop 
Journal 66 (Autumn 2008), 129-162.
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Between Compliance and Defiance:  Interpreting the Behavior of Polish-speaking 
German Soldiers 
In the summer of 1914, government officials across Europe anxiously 
monitored popular reactions to the approach of war. What they observed, and what 
historians have subsequently continued to re-evaluate, was a complicated landscape 
that often failed to correspond with expectations. Civilian and military authorities in 
the eastern provinces of Germany had anticipated possible resistance to the call to 
arms among the Polish-speaking population. Instead they reported almost universal 
compliance. The president of the district of Oppeln (Upper Silesia) was especially 
effusive, describing the typical Polish-speaking soldier from his district as “animated 
by the same enthusiasm and love of the Fatherland as his German compatriot.” The 
president of the province of Posen, a heartland of historic Poland and thus a focus of 
special concern for German officials, was scarcely less emphatic in writing that local 
Polish-speakers exhibited a “completely patriotic and loyal attitude.”13 One Polish 
historian detected a “tinge of surprise” in the letters of Landräte (county 
administrators) in Upper Silesia observing that “the Poles are behaving neutrally and 
peacefully.”14 Reports from West Prussia, another region that used to be part of the 
old Commonwealth, were at first more alarmist, with some local inhabitants said to be 
13 Alexander Watson, "Fighting for Another Fatherland: The Polish Minority in the 
German Army 1914-1918," English Historical Review 126, no. 522 (October 2011), 
1142-3. 
14 Marek Czapliński, Adam Napieralski, 1861-1928: biografia polityczna (Wrocław: 
Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1974), 183.
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avoiding the draft—the only area of the Reich where this was evident.15 But taking 
into view a fuller range of official accounts, it seems clear that this was a misleading 
first impression of “panicking” authorities. West Prussian Landräte offered 
reassurance that not only was mobilization proceeding smoothly overall but a “not 
inconsiderable number of Poles” were volunteering.16
If resistance to the call to arms was vanishingly rare, even among populations 
viewed with habitual suspicions, the opposite reaction—enthusiastic celebration of 
the outbreak of war—was also relatively uncommon. Karol Małłek, a resident of 
Mazuria (southern East Prussia), a Polish-speaking but predominantly Protestant 
region that had been ruled by the Hohenzollerns since the sixteenth century and 
therefore had impeccable loyalist credentials, was an adolescent when the First World 
War broke out. In a later memoir, he did not describe any resistance to the call to 
arms, but recalled that mobilization was accompanied by fear and sadness: “Everyone 
cried and wailed: wives for husbands, mothers for sons.”17 Such a characterization 
was, to be sure, very much what one would expect from a post-war Polish-patriotic 
and socialist memoir.  But it dovetails convincingly with recent historiography re-
evaluating the idea that a rapturous “spirt of 1914” swept Germany, and perhaps 
Europe more broadly, as the continent’s great powers headed to war. In his study of 
public responses in Germany in July and August 1914, Jeffrey Verhey found that 
15 Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914:  Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 95.
16 Watson, “Fighting,” 1143.
17 Karol Małłek, Z Mazur do Verdun: Wspomnienia 1890-1918 (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 
1967), 175-6.
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outpourings of patriotic, jingoistic exuberance were limited to a rather narrow milieu 
of young, educated, middle-class urban residents. Other demographic groups, 
including the working class but also the rural population, tended to respond to the 
outbreak of the war with fear and unease.18 In his study of rural Bavaria during the 
First World War, Benjamin Ziemann similarly concluded that “people responded to 
the announcement of German mobilization with much despondency and 
pessimism.”19 Similar patterns unfolded in the Habsburg Monarchy, unsettling some 
familiar stereotypes. Fears that certain nationalities, such as the Czechs, would defy a 
call to arms, proved unfounded: mobilization of Czech troops was, in the words of 
one historian, “faultless.” At the same time, there was little evidence that groups with 
a reputation for imperial loyalty, such as the Slovenes, were enthused about going to 
war. In her study of the wartime Slovene lands, Pavlina Bobič found that the most 
common sentiment in the summer of 1914 was “distress—fear in the face of the 
unknown.”20 It is not surprising that the term “pragmatic conformity,” which the 
historian Rok Stergar used to describe the attitude of Slavic recruits in the Habsburg 
military, has been picked up by the Polish historian Ryszard Kaczmarek as an equally 
18 Verhey, op cit.
19 Benjamin Ziemann, War Experience in Rural Germany 1914-1923, trans. Alex 
Skinner (New York/Oxford: Berg, 2007), 19.
20 Pavlina Bobic, War and Faith: The Catholic Church in Slovenia (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), 32.
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apt descriptor of the attitudes of Polish-speaking recruits in the Hohenzollern 
military.21
Nonetheless, old stereotypes, identifying certain groups as inherently 
"unreliable", soon resurfaced. By 1915, German officials were again voicing alarm 
that Polish-speaking soldiers, especially those from Posen and West Prussia, regions 
that had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to its eighteenth-
century partition, were exhibiting a greater tendency to desert or allow themselves to 
be captured. In November 1915, the Prussian War Ministry stipulated that Polish-
speakers could no longer be concentrated in geographically adjacent regiments based 
in the East, as had been the practice at the outbreak of the war to facilitate rapid 
mobilization. Instead, the pre-war practice of dispersing Polish-speakers into units 
across the Reich was revived, with the aim of preventing the formation of 
concentrated groups of disaffected soldiers. Given their reputation for loyalty, recruits 
from Upper Silesia were subsequently exempted from this policy of dispersal.22
Were Polish-speaking German soldiers actually more likely to defect than 
other German soldiers? Several scholars have investigated the question and have 
cautiously answered “yes,” but a clear picture remains elusive. Even if all relevant 
21 Ryszard Kaczmarek, Polacy w armii Kazera (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
2014), 50, citing Rok Stergar, “Die Bevölkerung der slowenischen Länder und die 
Allgemeine Wehrpflicht”, in Glanz-Gewalt-Gehorsam. Militär und Gesellschaft in 
der Habsburgermonarchie (1800 bis 1918), eds. Laurence Cole, Christa Hämmerle, 
and Martin Scheutz, (Essen: Klartext, 2011), 144.
22  Watson, “Fighting,” 1156-7.  Pre-war policy is discussed on p. 1143. It seems that 
the policy was never applied to troops from East Prussia (Mazuria).
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records had survived, no one was systematically tracking the mother tongue of 
deserters. The resourceful attempts at quantification made by scholars such as 
Alexander Watson have largely used prisoner-of-war figures as a very rough proxy 
for desertion, under the assumption that high rates of capture correlated with a greater 
willingness to surrender. These indirect estimates suggest that desertion by Polish-
speaking soldiers may have been somewhat higher than average, though at least one 
measure indicates lower-than-average desertion in the late stages of the war.23 
Qualitative assessments from military authorities were also mixed, with some 
commentators insisting on the absolute reliability of Polish-speaking troops.24 Vague 
and generic expressions of distrust, in turn, probably tell us more about the prejudices 
23  Of the 712,000 German soldiers in Allied captivity at the end of the war, only 4.9 
percent were identified as Poles, somewhat lower than the presumptive percentage of 
Polish-speakers in the German army. Among German soldiers captured in the summer 
of 1918, the percentage was especially low (2.8 percent), suggesting to Watson a 
striking rise in compliance over the course of the war. A sample calculation from a 
single village in the Posen region, however, produced a percentage of prisoners of war 
roughly twice the average for the army as a whole. Figures from ibid, 1160, 1164, and 
1161 (respectively).
24 In addition to comments already noted about near universal compliance with 
mobilization in the summer of 1914, Watson notes that Otto von Hindenburg insisted 
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of the commentators than actual behaviour by Polish-speaking soldiers.25 Indeed, 
scholars such as Christoph Jahr and Benjamin Ziemann have characterized the 
scrutiny directed at Polish-speaking soldiers (as well as soldiers from Alsace-
Lorraine) as fundamentally similar to the antisemitic suspicions that led to the 
conducting of a “Jewish census” of military participation in 1916.26 To be sure, these 
historians have accepted that Polish-speaking soldiers were genuinely more likely to 
desert or surrender.27 But they have also argued that, in Ziemann’s words, the 
“harassment and discrimination” practiced by Prussian military authorities “helped 
create the group of soldiers most dissatisfied and most willing to go over to the 
enemy.”28 Alexander Watson, by contrast, began his analysis of the behaviour of 
on the "outstanding" performance of Polish-speaking troops on the eastern front: ibid, 
1147-8. Many reports by officers drew a sharp distinction between soldiers from 
Alsace-Lorraine and Polish-speaking soldiers, with the former deemed disloyal, the 
latter reliable: ibid, 1154-5.
25 Mention of desertion in a letter to a Roman Catholic priest, for example, was 
interpreted by higher-ranking officers as indicative of general incitement to treason by 
the clergy: ibid, 1148-9.
26 Christoph Jahr, Gewöhnliche Soldaten: Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und 
britischen Heer 1914-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). Jahr refers 
to treatment of Polish, Danish, and Alsatian soldiers as “very similar” to treatment of 
Jews (263).  On the Jewish census, see Tim Grady, The German-Jewish Soldiers of 
the First World War in History and Memory (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2011), 33-5.  On broader anxieties about Jews prevalent among German military 
authorities, see Brian E. Crim, "'Our Most Serious Enemy': The Specter of Judeo-
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Polish-speaking soldiers with the assumption that, from the outset of the war, “Poles 
lacked the patriotic allegiances of their German colleagues." Pointing to an apparent 
relative drop in rates of desertion and surrender by1918, he went on to conclude that 
the steps taken by the German army to disperse and monitor Polish-speaking soldiers 
“successfully managed to contain Polish disloyalty.”29 
One can find material in the memoirs of former German soldiers to support both 
of these seemingly divergent narratives. Some accounts emphasized the destructive 
impact of the war on an incipient sense of attachment to state and society. Paul 
Orlinski, a soldier born in the Upper Silesian industrial conurbation, wrote to a local 
(German-language) newspaper in 1919 that it was the prejudice that he experienced in 
the military that undermined not only a sense of state patriotism but also his incipient 
German-national identification. From a Polish-speaking background, Orlinski 
considered himself thoroughly “germanized” after having gone through the school 
system: “my ‘germanized’ heart burned when I was told by ‘true’ Germans [in the 
army] that we came from ‘der Polakei,’ ‘Oberpodolien,’ ‘the ends of the earth’ 
Bolshevism in the German Military Community, 1914-1923." Central European 
History 44, No. 4 (December 2011), 624-41.
27 Ziemann concluded that “only soldiers from national minorities frequently did so 
[defected] together in larger groups or in quick succession.”  Benjamin Ziemann, 
Violence and the German Soldier in the Great War, trans. Andrew Evans (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 94.
28 Ziemann, War Experiences, 102.
29 Watson, “Fighting,” 1139 (first quote), 1163 (second quote).
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[weitvergessenen Winkel ], and so forth.”30 Arka Bożek, who would later become a 
prominent Polish activist but was still a teenager at the end of the First World War, 
described in his memoirs being unsure at this point whether he was or was not a 
German. His subsequent process of identify formation, he wrote, was shaped by the 
experience of systematic exclusion by fellow soldiers: “The Germans do not consider 
us as their own…. To our ‘comrades’ there, we were not Germans, and so we [Polish-
speaking Upper Silesians] instinctively hung out together.”31 
Other post-war testimonies, however, seemed to dovetail with Watson’s 
suggestion that many Polish-speaking soldiers were already irrevocably hostile to the 
German state and could only be kept in line through surveillance and coercion. As one 
veteran from the Posen region wrote in a later novelistic rendering of his experiences, 
“the Pole carried the Prussian rifle because he had too….When he donned the 
soldier’s uniform, he became a performer of orders and nothing more.”32 But if one 
reads on, this sense of resentful detachment from the German war effort gives way to 
a narrative of transformation, in which Polish-speakers' collective identity was 
defined by, as well as against, the experience of service in the German military. 
Describing the climactic battles of the summer of 1918 on the Western front, the 
author wrote that “the Poznanian divisions, thrown from sector to sector, never lost, 
on marches or in battles, the values of daring, disciplined, hardened and exceptionally 
obstinate soldiers. Maintained by iron discipline, educated in Prussian schools, trained 
30 Paul Orlinski, “Brief an den ‘Oberschlesier,’” Der Oberschlesier, 17 October 1919.
31 Arka Bożek, Pamiętniki (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 1957), 53–55.
32 Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie, illustrated by Leon Prauziński (Poznań: 
Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1948), 6.
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by Prussian officers, Poznanian ‘boys from the country’ constituted the most 
physically and morally healthy soldierly material.”  The author went on to describe 
the continuity between the discipline that Poznanians learned in the fight against 
Germanization and the discipline they demonstrated in fighting as part of the German 
army—a cohesion, he emphasized, that Poles in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian 
empires noticeably lacked.33 The story of alienation from the German state, in short, 
ends up being difficult to disentangle from a story of integration into the German 
state.
Compared to dramatic novelistic narratives like Ulrich’s, diary entries and 
letters to family members tended to draw out quieter ambiguities in soldiers’ everyday 
experiences. Consider, for example, the account that Kazimierz Wallis, a soldier from 
the Upper Silesian industrial region, sent to his father about having recently been 
awarded the Iron Cross, second class, after an encounter with Allied forces in the 
autumn of 1917.  Wallis wrote: “I was not for a single moment trying to get an Iron 
Cross but rather to be able to return home, because my Fatherland might need me 
someday, and my life belongs to our queen [the Virgin Mary], whom I want to serve 
faithfully for my whole life…. I am sending the Iron Cross home today.  Keep it for 
me as a souvenir of the struggle in Flanders.”34 As the historian Ryszard Kaczmarek 
suggests in his gloss on this passage, such narration brings to mind Jaroslav Hašek’s 
character, Josef Švejk, whose bumbling subversions within the Habsburg military 
have generally been viewed not so much as expressions of an alternative (Czech) 
patriotism but rather as highlighting the absurdities of war. Wallis’s cheeky framing 
33 Ibid, 149.
34 Quoted in Kaczmarek, 218-9.
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of self-preservation as inherently “patriotic,” coupled with the generic nature of the 
reference to his “Fatherland”—Was he referring to his (current) German Fatherland?  
A (future) Polish Fatherland?—suggest a similar sense of sceptical detachment. And 
yet, as the subsequent, more earnest reference to life-long devotion to the Virgin Mary 
indicates, even a generic, fill-in-the-blank understanding of duty to country should not 
be seen as utterly cynical or inauthentic. The Christian principle of “rendering unto 
Caesar what is Caesar’s,” after all, has been invoked to emphasize the limits of 
service to a sovereign authority but also to emphasize the serious moral imperative of 
fulfilling one’s legitimate duties to any such authority, temporary and contingent as it 
might be.
Modern states have, of course, aimed to inculcate a deeper identification, a 
sense of active participation in a state community rather than simply submission to 
authority. But if one considers some of the specific mechanisms involved in creating 
such a sense of (to borrow Watson’s phrase) “patriotic allegiance”, it is clear that they 
applied to Polish-speakers as well as to German-speakers. The territories where a 
majority of inhabitants spoke Polish had been continuously part of the Prussian state 
since the Congress of Vienna (and some territories considerably longer). Families in 
these regions had multi-generation traditions of Prussian military service, fostering 
identification with particular regiments and a degree of identification with Prussian 
military victories, from the “war of liberation” in 1813 to the Franco-Prussian War in 
1870.35 Polish-speakers enrolled and participated in the activities of veterans 
35 Kaczmarek notes that the hundredth anniversary of the 1813 campaigns against 
Napoleon seem to have resonated among Polish-speaking German subjects, 
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associations (Kriegervereine) as readily as their German-speaking counterparts.36 
Indeed, the Polish press in Upper Silesia lamented that veterans groups often seem to 
have been more popular than Polish-patriotic associations.37 But at least some 
members of veterans groups did not see an incompatibility between the state 
patriotism fostered by the Kriegervereine and a Polish cultural/linguistic national 
affiliation: In 1908, for example, it emerged that ten officials of the local 
Kriegervereine in Upper Silesia had voted for the Polish party in the recent Landtag 
election, leaving local nationalists to debate whether German state patriotism had 
been infiltrated by Polish nationalism or the other way around.38 
While the ultimate political aspirations of Polish-speakers were often murky 
and subject to rival forms of speculation, their linguistic identity—the fact that they 
contributing to greater identification with the German military and a "fascination with 
German power," 51-3.
36 By 1912, veterans groups enrolled 82,388 members in the district of Oppeln--one 
out of every five men of voting age. Stanisław Michalkiewicz, ed. Historia Śląska, 
vol. 3, part 2 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1984), 301. This was 
roughly the same rate of membership as in Prussia as a whole. See Thomas 
Rohkrämer, Der Militarismus der “kleinen Leute”: Die Kriegervereine im Deutschen 
Kaiserreich, 1871–1914 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 271–73.  It is interesting and 
worth noting that there seem to have been a vastly greater number of Polish-speakers 
in German/Prussian veterans groups than in equivalent Austrian/Habsburg veterans 
groups.  Shortly before the outbreak of the war, there were only 3,200 Polish-
speaking veterans in the Österreichische Militär-Veteran Reichbsund (ÖMVR), only a 
few percent of the total membership. Cole, Military, 300.
Page 18 of 48
Cambridge University Press
Central European History
For Peer Review
19
were Polish-speakers—would seem to have been a more straightforward determinant 
of a distinctive experience within the Germany army. As Watson noted, “Poles were 
obliged to function in a foreign tongue” since German was the sole language of 
command.39 And yet the realities of everyday linguistic practice were rather more 
complex. While no doubt often still perceived as “foreign,” German had been the 
language of primary school instruction for Polish-speaking Prussians for two 
generations. 40 It was thus a language with which all Polish-speaking recruits would 
have been familiar and in which they would have been able to communicate, even if 
they, in Kaczmarek’s words, “did not always speak German properly.”41  Indeed, 
many diaries and memoirs by Polish-speaking soldiers convey the normality of 
everyday interaction in German. Józef Iwicki, a native of West Prussia with a middle-
37 James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a 
Central European Borderland, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 
95.  On the importance of veterans associations in cultivating a sense of German state 
patriotism, see Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and 
Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 46.
38 Bjork, Neither, 137.
39 Watson, “Fighting,” 1145.
40 On language policy in the eastern borderlands, see John J. Kulczycki, School 
Strikes in Prussian Poland, 1901-1907 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 
1981); William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews:  The Nationality Conflict in the 
Prussian East, 1770-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Bjork, 
Neither, especially 61-2.
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class background and a strong Polish identification, wrote to his mother that his 
German fellow soldiers, accustomed to conversing with him in German, were 
surprised to find out that he knew Polish and read Polish newspapers.42 Arka Bożek, 
the son of a small farmer who would go on to become a leading Polish national 
activist in Upper Silesia, recalled a less welcoming attitude but reported a similar 
degree of ease in the use of a shared school language. “You speak German as fluently 
as they do,” he remembered thinking to himself after an unpleasant exchange with his 
commanding officer, “but they still call you a damned Pole.”43  
Just as we should not exaggerate the complete unfamiliarity of standard 
German for soldiers of Polish-speaking background, we should also not overestimate 
its familiarity for German-speaking soldiers. Soldiers from various regions of the 
Reich were keenly aware of the differences between their spoken dialects and the 
school language that served as their common code. Indeed, Slavic/Polish linguistic 
difference was often viewed as simply one example of the army’s broader linguistic 
diversity, reflected in the plethora of regional dialects. Józef Iwicki expressed his 
frustration at this tendency of his fellow soldiers to normalize and relativize Polish 
difference: “they understand that I am a Pole but at the same time [think that I am] a 
41 Kaczmarek, 218.
42 Letter of 14 February 1915, in Józef Iwicki, Z myśla o Niepodleglej… Listy Polaka, 
żolnierza armii niemieckiej, z okopów i wojny światowej (1914-1918), ed. and 
introduction by Adolf Juzwenko (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 
1978), 42-3.
43 Bożek, 54.
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German, like a Bavarian or a Saxon!”44 Karol Małłek, a native of East Prussia who 
would later become a Masurian-Polish activist, also recalled his fellow soldiers 
categorizing one another according to regional criteria, but he described it as intuitive 
rather than frustrating. Remarkably, his discussion of the role that language played in 
his experience in the German army did not even mention the distinction between 
Polish and German. Malłek noted that his unit “consisted mostly of Germans from the 
South: Bavarians, Badeners, Würtembergers, Alsatians, and Lorrainers. There were a 
few Germans from the north, so-called Prussians, several Kashubians, and seven 
Prussian Masurians. Between these groups [southerners and northerners] there was a 
huge antagonism….Various dialects were spoken, so that in a short time I learned all 
of them more quickly than the literary language in my school in Brodowo and until 
today can get by in them pretty well.”45 Other Polish-speaking soldiers were as keen 
to comment on religious differences and solidarities as on linguistic ones. Kazimierz 
Wallis, a soldier from the industrial region of Upper Silesia cited earlier, gave his 
father a detailed account of the fifteen Catholics who were in his unit, most from 
Hannover. One was from near his hometown and also spoke Polish, but a different 
soldier, a German-speaking Catholic from Middle Silesia, was described as his “best 
comrade, with whom I have the best mutual understanding.”46   
While standard German served as the operative lingua franca in regionally 
diverse military units, there was no blanket ban on use of Polish, and considerable 
tolerance of Polish conversations and even collective Polish singing tended to prevail 
44 Iwicki, 42-3.
45 Małłek, 234.
46 Cited in Kaczmarek, 221-2.
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where sufficient Polish-speakers were present. As noted earlier, the post-1915 policy 
of dispersing Poles from Posen and West Prussia across military units meant that such 
critical masses of Polish-speakers were most common among those who came from 
the “reliable” regions of Upper Silesia or Masuria. When those exposed to these 
divergent policies encountered one another, they were, predictably, confused. One 
soldier from Posen, embedded in an almost exclusively German-speaking unit, 
recalled his surprise at meeting a group of new recruits from Upper Silesia chatting 
loudly in their local Polish dialect. When he asked whether they were not banned 
from using Polish (which he thought was a general norm, based on his own 
experience), they replied that although they did not really know how to write in 
(standard) Polish, they would certainly speak “po swojemu” (after their own 
fashion).47 This captured both the internal logic and the paradoxes of the German 
state’s language policy. The reference to not being able to read and write in Polish 
pointed to one of reasons for the perceived patriotic reliability of Upper Silesians and 
Masurians:  the fact that they seemed to accept a degree of gradual linguistic 
germanization, a process much more fiercely opposed in Posen and West Prussia. 
Polish literacy was certainly not extinguished in Upper Silesia, thanks to informal 
teaching facilitated by the Polish press and local clergy, but a shift to primary literacy 
in German among younger generations was unmistakable.48 In such a context, 
47 Ibid, 219.
48 On linguistic germanization in Upper Silesia, see Bjork, Neither, 89-98; for 
Masuria, see Andreas Kossert, Preußen, Deutsche oder Polen? Die Masuren im 
Spannungsfeld des ethnischen Nationalismus 1870–1956 (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 
2001), 55-62.
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allowing some opportunities to use Polish, especially in the form of dialects used for 
oral communication, might be seen as a kind of safety-valve mechanism facilitating 
ultimate linguistic integration. Germany’s delicate balance between linguistic 
assimilation and tolerance of limited linguistic pluralism was, it is worth noting, quite 
similar to policy in France in its own on-going campaign of linguistic and cultural 
nationalization.  The French army also allowed significant regional concentrations of 
troops in initial mobilization, which in turn resulted in widespread use of Breton, 
Occitan or Corsican in particular military units. Increased regional mixing over the 
course of the conflict was meant to facilitate “an inevitable process of 
frenchification.” But this ostensibly inclusive process of integration involved, in 
practice, the “hostile and xenophobic” treatment of soldiers who continued to use 
local dialects rather than standard French.49
While knowledge of Polish was a potentially isolating factor within the 
German military, marking a minority off from the majority, it also served, at least on 
the eastern front, as a potential bridge allowing communication with enemy soldiers.  
Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops also spoke Polish, and millions more spoke 
dialects of Ukrainian or Russian that would have been more or less intelligible for a 
Polish speaker from Prussia. This could, of course, facilitate defection to the enemy of 
Polish-speaking German soldiers. But given the overall dynamics of the eastern front, 
where German forces were far more often victorious than defeated and therefore far 
49 Aviv Amit, Regional Language Policies in France during World War II 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), quotes from 23. On language policy in the run-up to 
the war, see also Eugen Weber’s classic Peasants into Frenchmen: The 
Modernization of Rural France (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976).
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more Russian than German soldiers were taken prisoner, shared knowledge of Polish 
almost certainly facilitated more defections to German forces than defections by 
German forces. In one memoir, for example, a Polish-speaking German soldier 
recounted an episode in which his assurances to a Polish-speaking Russian soldier led 
to the surrender of more than two hundred men.50  
Thus far, we have been examining the role of Polish-speakers in the German 
war effort at the level of individual soldiers’ behaviours, experiences, and attitudes. 
But many of these individuals, as well as the state authorities who carefully monitored 
their actions, also looked to Polish activists—publicists and politicians—as potential 
interlocutors who could articulate what “Polish” interests were and how they might be 
reconciled those of the German state. The remainder of this essay will be focused on 
the awkward dual role played by one set of Polish activists, often described as the 
“conciliationists.” Domestically, within the pre-war frontiers of the German Empire, 
the conciliationists continued their longstanding function of representing the interests 
of Polish-speaking citizens.  But in the new, volatile context of the war, they also 
served as the most active and consistent advocates of a germanophile option for the 
Polish lands as a whole, laying out a vision of Polish national autonomy and 
development under the auspices of a German-dominated Central Europe. In the 
process, the conciliationists ended up blurring almost beyond recognition the line 
between Polish-patriotic activism and collaboration, between being a Polish voice in a 
German conversation and a German voice in a Polish conversation.
50 Kaczmarek, 300, citing an anecdote in the memoirs of Jan Mazurkiewicz about 
Polish-speaking soldiers in the Russian army coordinating their surrender with Polish-
speaking counterparts on the German side.  
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Leading from the Margins? Prussian Poles and the Kingdom of Poland
Anxiety among German authorities about whether Polish-speakers would 
comply with wartime mobilization tended to be squarely focused on the publicists and 
politicians who promoted the Polish national cause—Polish “agitators”, as they would 
have most commonly been called. There were contingency plans to arrest such 
“agitators” immediately in the case of a general strike or war, including figures who 
were considered moderate or conservative within the Polish national movement.51 But 
in the summer of 1914, as mobilization began and war was declared, a version of the 
“spirit of August” seemed to embrace Germany’s Polish elites. All members of the 
Polish party’s Reichstag delegation voted in favor of war credits.52 Polish-national 
newspapers were allowed to continue uninterrupted publication and were subjected to 
lighter censorship than in the Russian or Habsburg empires.53 The sense that Polish 
national sentiment and support for the German war effort could go hand-in-hand was 
underlined by a pastoral letter issued by Edward Likowski, whose appointment as 
Archbishop of Poznań-Gniezno—and ex officio primate of Poland—was approved by 
51  An example of one such list can be found in Archiwum Państwowe w Opolu, 
Regierungsbezirk Oppeln, Sygnatura 116, Oberpräsident Schlesiens to 
Regierungspräsident Oppeln, April 3, 1913. See also Czapliński, 181.
52 Marian Orzechowski, “Działalność polityczna Wojciecha Korfantego w latach i 
wojny światowej,” Zaranie Śląskie 4 (1963), 590–1.
53 Keya Thakur-Smolarek, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die polnische Frage: Die 
Interpretationen des Kriegsgeschehens durch die zeitgenössischen polnischen 
Wortführer (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 73-4.
Page 25 of 48
Cambridge University Press
Central European History
For Peer Review
26
the German government just prior to the outbreak of war. Citing persecution of 
Catholics in the Russian empire, Likowski called on the faithful to pray for German 
victory and assured those being called up for German military service that they would 
be fighting for a “just cause.”54
This baseline consensus among Polish-national elites is important for 
interpreting the wartime behaviour of the several million individual German citizens 
who voted for these men to represent them in the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag, 
who read the newspapers that they published, and who participated in the rituals that 
they led. The clear message being conveyed to this community by the entire national 
Polish leadership was that compliance with the German war effort was in the interest 
of the Polish nation while acts of defiance, such as desertion, were not. Beneath this 
broad but thin consensus, however, two very different messages were being sent 
about how Poles should understand the extent and meaning of compliance. One 
approach was promoted by the National Democrats, the most cohesive and disciplined 
ideological grouping across all of the Polish lands and especially dominant in the 
Poznań region. The other was articulated by a looser coalition of publicists known as 
“conciliationists” or “activists,” led by Adam Napieralski, owner of the Katolik 
publishing house and “press king” of Upper Silesia, and Wiktor Kulerski, the editor of 
Gazeta Grudziądzka, a newspaper published in West Prussia that enjoyed the largest 
54 Robert Kufel, Edward Likowski (1836-1915): Sufragan poznański, Metropolita 
gnieźnieński i poznański, Prymas Polski (Zielona Góra: “Vers” Wydawnictwo 
Diecezji Zielonogórsko-Gorzowskiej, 2011), 487.  
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circulation in the Polish-speaking world.55  The differences between these approaches 
becomes clear if we compare the coverage of the war in Kurjer Poznański, the chief 
National Democratic organ in Germany, with war-time reporting in Katolik, 
Napieralski’s flagship newspaper, and Gazeta Grudziądzka.
During the July crisis and the opening days of the war, Kurjer Poznański 
avoided any hint of sympathy for the German government’s position, instead 
describing the slide into war as a “catastrophe” and a “hurricane,” threatening to 
destroy cross-partition links among Polish activists. Rather than actively exhorting 
readers to comply with mobilization, the editors simply noted that the “hard duress of 
war,” in Germany as in the other empires in which Poles lived, made such compliance 
unavoidable.56 When Kurjer Poznański published a list of local soldiers who had been 
killed in the first days of military action, the editors noted, in a striking rejection of 
solidarity with German co-combatants, “we are obviously only citing names that 
sound Polish.”57 Katolik also spoke to its readers as a nationally distinctive Polish 
population. But the editors portrayed loyalty to the Polish nation as compatible with 
sincere dedication to the German state. During the mobilization process, Katolik 
urged men who were called to arms to serve “faithfully and courageously” for “the 
55 For a more extended analysis of the views and strategy of the conciliationists, see 
James Bjork, “A Polish Mitteleuropa? Upper Silesia’s Concilationists and the 
Prospect of German Victory,” Nationalities Papers 29, No. 3 (2001), 477-92.
56 “Wojna,” Kurjer Poznański, 4 August 1914. See also “W przededniu katastrophy 
wojennej,” Kurjer Poznański, 1 August 1914.
57 “Piąta lista strat,” Kurjer Poznański, 22 August 1914.
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good and safety of their own families, their brethren, and our entire country.”58 When 
the newspaper reported on casualties, it honored all of “the fallen” who had been 
killed in German uniform, even as it emphasized that “there are a lot of Poles among 
them.”59 
As the war continued, the National Democrats and the conciliationists sent 
very different messages to their readers about the desirability of Polish-speaking 
civilians actively contributing to the German war effort. One of the primary 
mechanisms for such contributions was subscription to the war loans that the German 
government promoted every six months. Kurjer Poznański usually passed over these 
war loans campaigns in silence. In one instance where it did call attention to a new 
war loan drive, the notice consisted of a small block of German-language text, 
compartmentalized in the lower right corner of the first page.60 The message to 
readers was clear: voluntary support for the German war effort was not the business 
of readers of a Polish-language newspaper. Readers of Katolik, by contrast, were 
exposed to much more extensive and also much more “Polonized” reporting on 
German war loans. The editors not only published large-print advertisements for war 
loans in Polish (as well as in German) but also provided explanatory articles 
promoting the loans as both a practical investment and as a patriotic activity through 
which civilians could support brothers and sons engaged “in distant fields in the fight 
for the fatherland.”61 The rendering of these appeals into Polish and the limited 
58 “Powołanym pod broń,” Katolik, 5 August 1914.
59 “Czesc poległym,” Katolik, 15 August 1914.
60 “Zeichnet die vierte Kriegsanleihe!” advertisement in Kurjer Poznański, 2 March 
1916.
61 “Zakupujcie trzecią pożyczkę wojenną,” Katolik, 4 September 1915.
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deployment of the term “German” signalled that participation in the war effort did not 
require or indicate cultural Germanization. Potential subscribers to war loans were not 
described as “Germans” or the “German people” but as “German citizens” (obywatele 
niemieckie), and the cause to which they were contributing was not “the German 
nation” or even “Germany” but “our fatherland” (nasza ojczyzna), “the state” 
(państwo), or “the empire” (Rzeszy).62 Gazeta Grudziądzka did not endorse war loans 
quite so explicitly. But on the occasion of the spring 1916 war loan, it did include a 
full-page Polish-language advertisement, just above exhortations to readers to 
subscribe to the newspaper itself, as well as a news story stating matter-of-factly that 
war loans were something in which “the entire population takes part.”63 
The divergent messages that different Polish periodicals conveyed about what 
it meant for Poles to fulfil their wartime obligations to the German state were, in 
many ways, a continuation of pre-war debates about how invested Poles should be in 
the domestic politics of the empires in which they lived. The National Democrats in 
62 “Piąta pożyczka wojenna Rzeszy,” Katolik, 5 September 1916.
63 Gazeta Grudziądzka, 4 March 1916. Full-page advertisement on p. 4. News story, 
“Pożyczka wojenna i wynagrodzenia,” on p. 3. Trying to evaluate the relative uptake 
of subscriptions to war loans across different regions and demographic groups would 
be a worthwhile research project, if surviving sources are detailed enough to facilitate 
it. An older study by Konrad Roesler concluded that “all circles of the population” 
participated in war loans almost until the end of the war. Konrad Roesler, Die 
Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Duncker and 
Humbolt, 1967), 166, quoted in Stephen Gross, Central European History, vol. 42, 
no. 2 (June 2009), 244. 
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particular continued to insist that it was possible, in wartime as in peace, to observe a 
minimalist sense of duty to respective imperial states while maintaining a sense of 
ultimate loyalty to the Polish nation. As an editorial in Kurjer Poznański in the 
autumn of 1916 argued, “Polish soldiers fulfil their obligations fighting in the armies 
of the three partitioning powers. Poland as such remains above and beyond the field 
of struggle.”64 But this message, presented as the counsel of sober realism, risked 
seeming oblivious to the realities of total war. How could Poles view with cool 
detachment an “obligation” that involved killing their co-nationals while fighting 
under the command of their ostensible enemies?  The wartime “activism” promoted 
by Napieralski and other conciliationists offered a more straightforward and thus 
perhaps more emotionally plausible approach. Rather than treating contributions to 
the German war effort as an abstract fulfilment of duty, the conciliationists presented 
the immediate results of that war effort—the German conquest of historic Polish lands 
previously ruled by Russia—as concrete steps toward Poland’s national emancipation. 
It was an explicit gamble that urged all Poles everywhere to fight energetically for the 
victory of the Central Powers, whether this meant redoubling previous Hohenzollern 
or Habsburg loyalties or renouncing previous Romanov allegiances.
Already in September 1914, Napieralski and Kulerski had signed an 
agreement with Matthias Erzberger, an influential Center-party politician and the 
coordinator of Germany’s propaganda efforts abroad.65 In return for promotion of the 
64 “Polacy a wojna,” Kurjer Poznański, 12 September 1916.
65  On Erzberger’s role in directing the Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst, which 
coordinated propaganda abroad within the Foreign Office, see Ludwig Richter, 
“Military and Civil Intelligence Services in Germany from World War I to the End of 
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German war effort, the Polish publishers were guaranteed regular access to the latest 
battlefront news to publish in their newspapers, which would be allowed to circulate 
in occupied parts of the Congress Kingdom (the Russian partition of Poland).66 It was 
Napieralski who proved most adept and aggressive in pursuing these possibilities. As 
more and more of the Congress Kingdom came under German control in 1915, his 
publishing activities expanded deeper into the region, facilitated and financially 
supported by the German government. In May 1915, he began publishing Dziennik 
Polski (The Polish Daily) in Częstochowa.  At the end of the year, he launched 
Godzina Polski (The Hour of Poland) in Łódź, with the aim of garnering a mass 
readership in Warsaw and other major urban centres across central Poland. In 
November 1916, the Katolik publisher also acquired the Warsaw women’s magazine 
Bluszcz (Ivy).67
In the eyes of the National Democrats and many other Poles, Napieralski’s 
close cooperation with the German government irredeemably compromised him. 
Godzina Polski was stigmatized as Gadzina Polski (The Polish Reptile), and there 
were calls to boycott it as, effectively, a “German” publication.68 Napieralski himself 
the Weimar Republic,” in Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century, Heike 
Bungert, Jan G. Heitman, and Michael Wala, eds. (Southgate, UK: Frank Cass, 2003), 
4-5.
66  Czapliński, 181-7. On Kulerski’s approach to conciliationism, see Tomasz 
Krzemiński, Polityk dwóch epok: Wiktor Kulerski (1865-1935) (Torun: Towarzystwo 
Naukowe w Toruniu, 2008), 131-6.  
67 Czapliński, 192-7.  
68 Ibid, 195.
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would later concede that his germanophile orientation was “the least popular in 
Poland.”69 But even historians sceptical of Godzina Polski’s Polish-patriotic 
credentials have conceded that the advantages that German patronage endowed, such 
as access to the latest news from the front, helped to attract a significant readership.70 
In a recent article examining wartime Polish debates about gender roles, Robert and 
Donata Blobaum had no qualms about treating Godzina Polski as a periodical that 
legitimately “represented Polish interests.” As they note, it effectively replaced the 
conservative and Russophile Kurjer Warszawski as Warsaw’s leading daily 
newspaper after 1915, thereby becoming an important factor in the formulation of 
wartime public opinion in the previous Russian partition zone.71 
Godzina Polski’s appeal to readers in the Congress Kingdom rested on two 
propositions. The first was that Germany was on the brink of winning the war. 
Europe, the editors wrote in one of the newspaper’s first issues, was already in “the 
final act of a historical drama” because the Central Powers advances on the eastern 
front in 1915 had “a decisive character.”72 These victories were, to be sure, the result 
of joint military efforts by the German and Habsburg empires, and the latter power 
might have seemed a more amenable partner for promoting Polish aspirations, given 
69 From a memoir quoted by Szramek, “Ś.P. Adam Napieralski,” Roczniki 
Towarzystwa Przyjaciól Nauk na Sląsku 2 (1930), 327.
70 Czapliński, 195-7. 
71 Roberta and Donata Blobaum, "A Different Kind of Home Front: War, Gender and 
Propaganda in Warsaw 1914-1918," in ed. Troy R.E. Paddock, World War I and 
Propaganda, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 247-70.
72 “Rezultaty,” Godzina Polski, 31 December 1915.
Page 32 of 48
Cambridge University Press
Central European History
For Peer Review
33
the degree of self-rule that Poles in Galicia had been offered since the late 1860s. This 
perception was reflected in the clear preference of the Polish Legions to work 
alongside Austrian rather than German forces. But the Dual Monarchy’s growing 
reliance on military support from Germany, coupled with anxieties about whether 
promotion of Polish national aspirations might subvert the Monarchy’s delicate 
internal constitution, ensured that German officials were the most important actors in 
determining the fate of the territory that came under joint occupation.73 Godzina 
Polski emphasized to readers that Germany’s recent battlefield successes reflected its 
underlying political, economic, and military strength, especially an impressive 
“ability to adjust the entirety of domestic life to the needs of the army.”74
The second core argument of Napieralski’s publications was that a victorious 
Germany would be willing to accommodate Polish national interests. This was no 
doubt a tougher sell, though the more relativist version—that  Germany was a more 
benevolent potential partner than Czarist Russia—was plausible. Russian authorities, 
like their German and Austrian counterparts, had expressed some sympathy for Polish 
national aspirations at the beginning of the war. But after Russian forces occupied 
much of Galicia in the first months of the conflict, it did not see it as an opportunity 
for a revival of “Poland” on foreign soil. Instead, the occupation was viewed in pan-
Slavic terms as a “reunification” of the Russian people. Ukrainian-speakers, 
especially the Orthodox among them, were clearly the population being wooed, not 
73 Leon Grosfeld, Polityka państw centralnych wobec sprawy polskiej w latach 
pierwszej wojny światowej (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydanictwo Naukowe, 1962), 156-
87.
74 “Wnioski,” Godzina Polski, 12 January 1916.
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Roman Catholic Poles.75 The conciliationists were confident that a reorganization of 
the historic Polish territories under the auspices of the Central Powers would be much 
more favourable to Polish national ambitions. In its very first issue, Godzina Polski 
assured readers in the Congress Kingdom that “the interest of Germany and Austria 
demands a strong Poland.”76  Readers of Katolik were, in turn, told that the German 
occupation of Warsaw had liberated the city from “Russian servitude” and had been 
conducted with “goodwill and benevolence.” “The future of Poland,” the editors 
concluded “lies in the support of the Central Powers.”77 
 The culmination of these hopes was the declaration in November 1916 of a 
formally independent Kingdom of Poland composed of former Russian territory under 
German and Austrian occupation. Katolik greeted the declaration with the exuberant 
headline “Poland Arises!” and approvingly quoted the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung’s description of the event as a “breakthrough moment in the history of 
Poland.”78  The new kingdom was, to be sure, kept on a short leash by German 
75 Mark von Hagen, "The Entangled Eastern Front in the First World War," in eds., 
Eric Lohr, Vera Tolz, Alexander Semyonov, and Mark von Hagen, The Empire and 
Nationalism at War (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2014), 26. See 
also von Hagen’s War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans 
in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).
76 “Godzina Polski,” Gazeta Grudziądzka, 13 January 1916. Gazeta Grudziądzka 
reproduced the entire text of the article from Godzina Polski, along with its own, 
somewhat more sceptical editorial gloss.
77 “W rocznicę oswobodzenia Warszawy,” Katolik, 8 August 1916.
78 “Polska powstaje!” Katolik, 7 November 1916.
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military authorities, who tended to view it instrumentally as a source of raw material 
and labour, as well as, potentially, hundreds of thousands of Polish troops who could 
fight on the side of the Central Powers.79  But a recent article by Winson Chu, Jesse 
Kauffman and Michael Meng has argued that rather than simply creating a “statelet” 
without national substance,80 German administration under the auspices of General 
Hans Hartwig von Beseler provided genuine, if limited, opportunities for self-
government.  It “restored Polish participation in municipal governance [and] allowed 
for the re-establishment of Polish-language instruction” in local schools. Indeed, this 
“active encouragement of Polish national aspirations” raised alarm among minorities 
in the Congress Kingdom—especially Jews, but Germans as well—who feared that 
German policy was abandoning them to Polish linguistic and cultural domination.81 If 
such relatively favourable policies (for the Poles) were implemented by Beseler, a 
Protestant Prussian career military officer, it is not difficult to understand Napieralski 
holding out hope that a figure such as Erzberger, a long-time sympathizer with Polish 
grievances as well as a confidant of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, might encourage 
79 An excellent summary of the exploitative nature of the German occupation can be 
found in Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 
1914-1918 (London: Penguin, 2014), 407-14.
80 Marian Orzechowski, for example, uses the term państewka (statelet) to refer to 
German plans to create a Polish entity out of the territories of the Russian partition, 
“Działalność,” 580.
81 Winson Chu, Jesse Kauffman, and Michael Meng, “A Sonderweg through Eastern 
Europe? The Varieties of German Rule in Poland during the World Wars,” German 
History 31, No. 3 (September 2013), 318-44.  Quotes from 323 and 328.
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Berlin to adopt an even more strongly polonophile course.82 Napieralski and his close 
associate, Father Jan Kapica, came to view the notion of Mitteleuropa, famously 
promoted by the liberal politician Friedrich Naumann, as a promising framework for 
imagining a prominent place for Poland within a Central Europe that would be 
economically and politically dominated by Germany but that would remain culturally 
pluralistic.  Napieralski and Kapica were reportedly “enraptured” by the idea and 
discussed it “for hours.”83  
If the notion of reconciling Polish and German patriotism through such visions 
was not so far-fetched, the implications of this agenda for different parts of the Polish 
lands and for the relationship between them were complicated, as well as somewhat 
counter-intuitive. Napieralski had spent his career prior to 1914 lobbying for Polish 
cultural rights within the framework of the German Empire. Now he looked to the 
lands of (former) Russian Poland as the main stage where Poland’s national future 
would unfold.  His intensive engagement with this process from his new position as 
the leading publisher in central Poland represented an extraordinary expansion of 
influence. Indeed, the vitriol about the “collaborationist” nature of Napieralski’s 
activities may have been at least partly fuelled by the realization that the Katolik 
editor was now in a privileged position both to define the de facto program for Polish 
national revival and to denounce the opponents of that programme as themselves 
unpatriotic. Godzina Polski, for example, criticized the Warsaw municipal 
government’s policies of continuing monthly payments to the wives of men called 
82 Bjork, “Polish,” 482-5.
83 Emil Szramek, “Ks. Jan Kapica: Życiorys a zarazem fragment z Historji Górnego 
Śląska,” Roczniki Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk na Śląsku 3 (1931), 54.
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into Russian military service (rezerwistki) and protecting their right to stay in their 
apartments despite falling behind on rent.84 Such critiques of lingering popular 
“Russophilia” were similar to complaints by Polish Legionnaires that peasants in the 
occupied Congress Kingdom often remained loyal to the Czar and lacked a proper 
Polish spirit.85  In occupied Russian Poland, in short, it was plausible for those 
cooperating closely with the Central Powers to present themselves as the architects of 
Poland’s resurrection and their opponents as pining for a failed Russian imperial past.  
But the prominent role that Prussian Poles such as Napieralski played in 
establishing an autonomous Polish state under German auspices had a stark flipside.  
In watching “Poland’ re-merge on the map of Europe, they had to accept that this 
Poland would not actually include the lands where all of their previous nation-
building work had been concentrated. The German Empire was certainly not about to 
cede some of its pre-war territory to a new Polish state as part of a victorious post-war 
settlement. The best that the conciliationists could hope for was a set of parallel 
concessions in favour of use of the Polish language in the schools of Posen, West 
Prussia, and Upper Silesia. There was considerable optimism about such concessions 
through the middle years of the conflict, buttressed by the conviction that liberal, 
socialist and especially Catholic (Center) politicians in Germany were fundamentally 
sympathetic to Polish demands.86 Shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of 
84 Blobaum and Blobaum, 263-4.
85 Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny, Nasza Wojna I: Imperia, 1912-1916, 
(Warsaw: WAB, 2015), 280-1.
86 One article, for example, included extended quotations from Center politician Julius 
Bachem on the folly of trying to denationalize Prussia’s Polish population. “With 
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Poland, the editors of Katolik assured readers that this development would foster a 
systematic “drawing together of our nation and the German nation.” Prussian 
authorities would end discriminatory language laws, facilitating the “nurturing of our 
[Polish] nationality.” while those authorities could remain confident that “we are 
faithful and loyal citizens of the state to which we belong.”87 Already in the first years 
of the war, there had been some signs that these hopes were not misplaced. Center, 
Left Liberal, and Social Democratic delegates in the Reichstag had joined their Polish 
colleagues in the autumn of 1915 to amend the empire’s association law to provide 
greater scope for public speeches to be delivered in Polish, a development that 
garnered optimistic coverage in Gazeta Grudziądzka as well as the Katolik press.88
But getting similar cooperation from the entrenched Conservative-National 
Liberal majority in the Prussian Landtag or from the Prussian bureaucracy proved 
much more difficult. The government refused to implement the removal of the 
language paragraph from the association law until after the end of the war.89 In June 
1917, when the government finally issued a decree guaranteeing the limited use of 
regard to nationality,” Bachem argued, “the heterogeneity of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy offers an edifying example.” “W sprawie porozumienia Polaków z 
Niemców,” Katolik, 10 February 1916.
87 “Wobec wolnej Polski,” Katolik, 14 November 1916.
88 “Z powodu uchwały o paragrafu językowym,” Katolik, 2 September 1915. 
“Parlament niemiecki uchwała zmianę prawa o stowarzyszeniach, mianowicie też 
zniesienie paragrafu, zakazującego używania mowy polskiej na publicznych 
zebraniach,” Gazeta Grudziądzka, 2 September 1915.
89 “Zmiana ustawa o stowarzyszeniach,” Katolik, 3 June 1916. 
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Polish in religious instruction in schools in the province of Posen, the measure was 
conspicuously not extended to Upper Silesia (the district of Oppeln); the Prussian 
education minister explained that this would be inappropriate in a region where the 
local mother tongue was not Polish but “Wasserpolnisch,” a derogatory term for the 
local dialect. Napieralski and his fellow editors at Katolik tried to portray the measure 
optimistically as a “first step toward removing the causes of dissatisfaction of the 
Polish population”—a larger proportion of which, they noted more caustically, 
actually lived in Upper Silesia than in the Poznań region.90 But Napieralski’s ally, 
Father Kapica, described this sharply circumscribed concession as a “fiasco,” leaving 
the conciliationists with nothing to show to their own core constituency as a reward 
for loyal service to the German war effort.91
The tension between the drama of Poland’s national resurrection in the 
occupied east and the ongoing inexorability of germanization at home can also be 
seen in the diaries and memoirs of ordinary Polish-speaking German soldiers. As 
Ryszard Kaczmarek has observed, the tours of duty that hundreds of thousands of 
Polish-speaking soldiers undertook in the lands of Russian Poland during the war cut 
against the grain of previous migration patterns. Poles had generally moved west in 
search of employment; the east, by contrast, was known to Prussian Poles primarily 
through literary imagination.92 Indeed, when Kazimierz Wallis was deployed to the 
eastern front in Volhynia, on the Polish-Ukrainian linguistic frontier, he described the 
90 “Nauka religii w języku polskim,” Katolik, 28 June 1917.
91 “Fiasco” from Father Kapica’s characterization of the policy in the Schlesische 
Volkszeitung, “Ks. Jan,” 56-7.
92 Kaczmarek, 299-300.
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countryside to his brother with reference to Henryk Sienkiewicz’s The Deluge, a 
novel he may have known through its serialization in the Katolik press that he read in 
his youth in Upper Silesia.93 Wallis was also stationed for a considerable length of 
time in Warsaw, and his descriptions of life in the Polish capital alternated between 
first-person identification and third-person fascination. This ambivalence began with 
language: the Polish that Wallis heard was “not like ours but a pure language that 
sounds so beautiful and pleasant that it even pleases the German.” He was similarly 
effusive about the beauty of local landmarks (parks, churches) but nonetheless noted 
that he happily returned to a German Soldatenheim for cheap and reliable meals, 
escaping the shortages and high prices of wartime Warsaw.94As Kaczmarek observes, 
for Wallis, “the Kingdom of Poland had a double meaning. On the one hand, the 
Poland of long ago was his homeland…On the other, it was for him simultaneously 
enemy territory, part of occupied Russia.”95 
Józef Iwicki’s letters reveal a more cynical attitude toward the resurrection of 
a Polish state under German auspices, especially plans for the creation of a Polish 
army under the command of the Central Powers. A native of West Prussia, and thus 
outside the orbit of Napieralski’s press empire, he seems to have read neither the 
Upper Silesia-based Katolik press nor any of new titles published in the (former) 
Russian partition; instead he favoured more germanophobe, in part overtly National 
93 Ibid., 304-5. Sienkiewicz’s death on November 15th, 1916—eerily proximate to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Poland—no doubt further spurred consciousness of 
and references to his work.
94 Ibid., 301-2.
95 Ibid., 299.
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Democratic, titles but also, interestingly, read a wide range of German newspapers as 
well.96 Iwicki noted with frustration that German policy “completely segregates the 
Congress Kingdom inhabitants (Królewniaków) from us,” and yet rather than trying 
to fight this compartmentalization, he concluded that “each partition zone needs to 
conduct its own separate politics.” Instead of trying to attach the Prussia’s Polish 
lands to the new Polish kingdom, local activists should aim for some kind of “separate 
German-Polish union” that would govern these regions and guarantee Polish language 
rights.97 It was a conclusion remarkably close to the policy of the Upper Silesian 
conciliationists, despite the distaste that Iwicki and many other Polish patriots felt 
toward the openly collaborationist strategy of Napieralski and his allies.
This degree of convergence was, of course, shaped by a simple shared 
assumption: that Germany would be the arbiter of any post-war settlement in East-
Central Europe. It was a common view up until the final weeks of the war. As 
Wojciech Poliwoda, a Polish-speaking resident of a rural community in Upper Silesia 
who was an adolescent during the war, recalled in a later memoir, German victories 
and conquests seemed “to make real the myth of Germany ruling over the entire 
world.”98 But by the autumn of 1918, when the Germany army suffered decisive 
defeats on the western front, it became clear that this was a bad bet. Conciliationsts 
such as Napieralski, who had banked most heavily and publicly on German victory, 
96 The published edition of Iwicki’s letters helpfully includes a glossary of all of the 
(many) newspapers mentioned by the author in his correspondence.  Iwicki, 301-3.
97 Letter from Iwicki to his mother, 27 November 1916, in ibid., 168-9.
98 Wiktor Kornatowski and Kazimierz Malczewski, eds. Wspomnienia Opolan 
(Warsaw: PAX, 1960). 231.
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saw almost all of their influence swiftly dissipate outside of their home base of Upper 
Silesia. Even in Upper Silesia, leadership of the Polish-speaking population passed 
quickly to more radical figures, such as Wojciech Korfanty, who had begun 
criticizing German policy more outspokenly in the later years of the war and who now 
called for immediate union with Poland.99  Polish activists were predictably keen to 
portray the entire Polish-speaking population as having always already been on the 
“right” side of the war. A Polish army organized in the final year of the war to fight 
alongside the Allies in France served as a useful symbol of this ostensible affinity. Of 
the 70,000 men who eventually served in this formation, a large majority was actually 
composed of émigré volunteers from the Western hemisphere (the United States, 
Canada, Brazil). But the roughly 17,000 recruited from among prisoners of war 
provided a plausible basis for a narrative in which Poles serving in German uniform 
had deserted at the first opportunity in order to fight instead alongside the French and 
British.100 This narrative was in turn connected up with post-war frontier struggles. In 
1920, during an uprising by Polish insurgents in the run-up to a frontier plebiscite in 
Upper Silesia, fliers targeted at Allied peacekeeping troops pointed to war-time 
99 Czapliński, 214-6.  Korfanty had led an earlier revolt, in 1903, against Napieralski’s 
moderate leadership of the Polish movement in Upper Silesia. Napieralski had been 
able to recover his dominant influence in the region in the years before the war, even 
purchasing the newspapers that Korfanty had used to promote his cause.  For the 
details of this long-term rivalry, see Bjork, Neither, chapters 2 and 3. 
100 Kaczmarek, 358-9; Eichenberg, 64. 
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defections by Polish-speaking German soldiers in claiming that the Poles, French, and 
British had always really been fighting on the same side.101
But if Polish participation in the German war effort very quickly shifted from 
seeming the most practical and high-profile form of national activism to seeming an 
embarrassment and an irrelevance, it could nonetheless not be forgotten. Across 
Europe, after all, veterans and widows of those killed in combat expected state 
acknowledgment of their sacrifice, not only, or even primarily, through monuments or 
commemorations but through provision of financial benefits to those who had made 
such sacrifices. For the new Polish state to have disavowed such obligations would 
have amounted to a form of self-delegitimization. Indeed, the holding of a frontier 
plebiscite in Upper Silesia meant that hundreds of thousands of Polish-speaking 
German citizens might reject affiliation with Poland altogether if Poland did not 
promise to provide benefits to veterans of the German army. Such considerations 
played a crucial role in the ultimate awarding of substantial benefits to the vast 
number of so-called “zaborcy” (a reference to the partition zones), who had fought in 
one of the imperial armies during the war. They were made eligible for payments only 
modestly lower than those provided to veterans of the Polish military.102 The fact that 
some of those lobbying for such benefits fought in the post-war Polish uprisings as 
101 Cited in Edward Mendel, Polacy na Górnym Śląsku w latach I wojny światowej: 
Położenie i postawa (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 1971), 103.
102 Veterans of the imperial armies received benefits in the range of 50 to 75 percent 
of the earnings of civil servants, while Polish veterans received benefits in the range 
of 60 to 80 percent. Eichenberg, 145-7. On the role of the Upper Silesian plebiscite in 
shaping policy on veterans’ benefits, see ibid., 138-9.
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well as in the German army during the war made it a bit easier to sell the policy in 
“patriotic” terms.103  
If the sheer ubiquity of service in the imperial armies made it impossible to 
ignore these experiences at the level of post-war public policy, it also made it an 
unavoidable part of post-war narratives of everyday life. Everyman autobiographies 
enjoyed great popularity in independent Poland, and among the most widely read was 
that of Jakub Wojciechowski (A Worker’s Own Life Story), which won a national 
competition in 1923 and was published in 1930. Wojciechowski was a native of the 
Posen region who had worked as a migrant labourer in Germany and had also been 
conscripted into military se vice before the war. He was then called back to duty at 
the outbreak of the war, at the age of twenty-three. His account of service in the 
Germany army illustrates the possibilities, but also the difficulties, of narrating such 
experiences in Polish-patriotic terms. A running theme of these sections of the 
autobiography is the tension between action and sentiment, between Wojciechowski’s 
immediate experiences and his feelings about them. He repeatedly emphasized his 
sense of alienation from Germany and the reluctance of his participation in the 
German war effort.  But only occasionally did he describe moments of outright 
defiance, as when he wrote on an examination, administered by a German officer, that 
Martin Luther was a “traitor to the Catholic faith.”104 More often, what 
103 Jan Karkoszka, a native of Nowy Bytom and veteran of both the German army and 
the Polish uprisings, was a leader in both Polish veterans’ organizations and 
international veterans’ organizations. Ibid., 121-2.
104 Jakub Wojciechowski, Życiorys własny robotnika (Poznań: Wydawnictwo 
Poznańskie, 1930), anecdote on p. 300. 
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Wojciechowski conveyed was a sense of helplessness at events unfolding around him. 
He recounted, for example, his horror as a German officer shot a Belgian priest who, 
the officer claimed, had been trying to seize his weapon: “I, as a Catholic, had to 
watch this.”105 Just as he found himself uncomfortably attached to a German war 
effort with which he did not identify, Wojciechowski lamented his inability to 
participate in the construction and defense of the Polish nation with which he did 
identify. Fighting for Poland against the Soviet Union, he wrote, was a “holy 
obligation,” unlike his unjustified service for Imperial Germany.106 And yet 
Wojciechowski never did fight for Poland; he only moved to the new Polish state in 
1924.
This gap between the normative history of “Poland” or “the Poles” on the one 
hand and the actual experiences of an “average Pole” on the other certainly did not 
preclude a degree of effective national inclusion in the interwar years. As can be seen 
in the celebration of everyman biographies such as Wojciechowski’s and in the 
provision of benefits to hundreds of thousands of zaborcy, the new nation-state 
managed to embrace as authentically Polish those who fought for the imperial powers 
during the First World War. But this remained a highly asymmetrical and limited 
form of inclusion. Whereas a tiny minority could think of their wartime actions as 
having shaped Polish history, thus meriting commemorative inscriptions on 
memorials like the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the vast remainder could only view 
105 Ibid., 358.
106 Ibid., 388-9.
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their experiences as picaresque tales, featuring service in the wrong armies and 
fighting on the wrong side of the wrong battles.
In West-Central Europe, and to some extent in Russia as well, discussions of 
patriotism in the First World War tend to be based on an assumption of continuity, of 
a certain stability in the relationship between family histories and national narratives.  
A “patriotic” memory of the war, in other words, involves a father, grandfather, or 
great-grandfather fighting in the uniform and the flag of the country of which one is 
currently a citizen. This model is of little use in trying to understand the experiences 
of most inhabitants of East-Central Europe. The empires for which millions of men 
had fought had collapsed by November 1918, leaving veterans to try to make sense of 
their wartime experiences in the context of new citizenships in new states. This essay 
has explored in some detail the experiences of one sub-group of this vast population--
Polish-speaking citizens of the German empire—with the aim of sketching out 
productive approaches to this broader phenomenon of tracing patriotism across 
national rupture.    
 One predictable theme has been the difficulty of distinguishing “patriotism” 
from mere compliance or an abstract sense of duty to recognized authority. If we 
accept, as some contemporary observers did, that passive submission to existing 
authorities and following orders constituted sufficient evidence of state patriotism, 
then this kind of patriotism can be seen as ubiquitous among the Polish-speaking 
population of the German empire, as well as the Habsburg and Russian empires. A 
“pure” form of Polish-national patriotism—refusing to serve in or defecting from 
imperial armies; fighting in identifiable Polish units—was, in turn, relatively rare. The 
picture changes, of course, if one takes into account expressions of sentiment, whether 
reluctance in participating in imperial war efforts or sympathy for Polish-national 
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aspirations. Such sentiments are not only a staple of retrospective memoirs published 
in independent Poland but are also frequently evident in wartime diaries and 
correspondence. Rather than privileging either behaviour (often undertaken under 
varying degrees of duress) or sentiment (often detached from direct experience) I 
have argued for keeping a variety of possible understandings of patriotism in play, 
moving between them in order to examine the nature of different relationships to 
Germanness and to Polishness. 
This kind of navigation is perhaps easiest to imagine as a private matter, an 
attempt by ordinary people to reconcile the apparently incompatible demands of rival 
ideological programs while maintaining some sense of stable personal identity. But as 
we have seen, individual-level wrestling with German and Polish orientations played 
out against a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. The prospect of German victory 
and the construction of a German-dominated Mitteleuropa created an opening for the 
revival of an autonomous Polish state on the territory of the old Russian partition 
zone.  Polish publicists such as Adam Napieralski argued that support for the German 
war effort could dovetail with promotion of Poland’s national resurrection, generating 
suspicions on both sides that one national interest was being manipulated on behalf of 
the other. While German military defeat doomed this attempted collaboration by the 
autumn of 1918, it was until then not only a viable initiative but arguably the most 
realistic attempt at German-Polish post-war conciliation. The promotion of such a 
vision by one of the most successful publishers in the Polish speaking world no doubt 
shaped the realm of the imaginable among the Polish-speaking public, both among 
Napieralski’s long-time readership in Upper Silesia and in the new markets of the 
Congress Kingdom. Rather than being incompatible with Polish patriotism, 
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cooperation with the German war effort was plausibly presented as a prerequisite for 
it.
Perhaps the most interesting dynamic connecting the high politics of the 
Katolik camp with the views expressed by ordinary Polish-speaking German soldiers 
in letters and memoirs is what might be described as a kind of “virtual patriotism,” a 
collective identification that was largely detached from, rather than built on, everyday 
experience. Both high-profile Polish publicists such as Napieralski and ordinary 
Polish-speaking soldiers such as Wallis or Iwicki or Wojciechowski were deeply 
embedded not only in power structures of the German state but also in a German 
cultural sphere. They spent much of their time promoting the German war effort and 
speaking German with German colleagues. But each of them also became, in various 
ways, invested in the development of a Polish national community that was 
geographically anchored in the Russian partition zone, far from their homes. They 
thus developed something of an emigré or diaspora relationship to the Polish nation-
building project, albeit more unstable and ambivalent because they still understood 
their home territories (especially Posen and West Prussia, but also Upper Silesia and 
East Prussia) to be both genuine Polish land and the territory to which their own 
destinies were tied. Polish-speaking German citizens, in short, were not simply 
engaged in a fight for a foreign (German) patria between 1914 and 1918, followed by 
a fight for their “real” (Polish) patria from November 1918. They found themselves 
engaged with both German and Polish fatherlands throughout the period, and it was 
not always clear, either at the time or in retrospect, in what ways and to what degree 
either patria was their own.  
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